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Technologicalinnovation is a topic that stirspassions....[I1t is
often involved in the historical competition of cultures, ideas, and
peoples. It is also a part of more everyday, albeit important, concerns:
the social roles we play, the work we do in organizations, and the
renewal of our industries. In effect, it often defines what we are and
what we do.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Technological innovation plays a vital social and economic function
in modem civilization. This technological innovation, the product of
human creativity, is fostered and protected by intellectual property
rights.2 As the importance of intellectual property has increased in our
society,3 so too has the market for the sale and licensing of these rights.
Those involved in the sale and licensing of intellectual property are-not
unlike their counterparts involved in the sale of tangible
goods-concerned with the effect that antitrust principles may have on
their businesses.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has recently released new
guidelines in an attempt to clarify the analysis it uses when deciding
whether to bring antitrust charges against entities involved in the

1. Louis G. TORNATZKY & MITCHELL FLEISCHER, THE PROCESSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION 9 (1990).
2. See infra part II.A.
3. See generally DONALD S.CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § IA (1992) (discussing the reasons for the increased interest in intellectual
property).
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licensing of intellectual property rights.4 The IP Guidelines have been
long awaited in the area of intellectual property licensing because the
process of predicting whether a proposed licensing agreement will be
challenged by the DOJ has become increasingly difficult due to the lack
of a coherent antitrust policy toward intellectual property.' With the
support of new resources allocated to the DOJ by Attorney General Janet
Reno and Congress, the DOJ has attempted to address the situation with
the IP Guidelines. 6
The IP Guidelines first clarify several basic assumptions concerning
the intersection of intellectual property and antitrust policies.7 These
assumptions include the concept that the owner of intellectual property
does not automatically have market power8 with respect to the technology involved.' Essential to the determination of market power and the

ability to exercise anticompetitive conduct" is the accurate definition
of the relevant market." The IP Guidelines define three basic types of
markets. 2 The first and most common market is the goods market. This
consists of the actual products which utilize the intellectual property in
question and any other goods that may be indirectly affected by these
goods. 3 The goods market has been the subject of antitrust analysis

4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter IP GUIDELINES].
5. Colloquy, 60 Minutes with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. DepartmentofJustice, 63 ANTITRUST L. 323, 332 (1994); see also Ira M. Millstein,
The Role of Antitrust in an Age of Technology, 9 CARDOzO L. REV. 1175, 1175-78 (1988) (noting
the importance of having intellectual property and antitrust laws that work together to promote
invention, innovation, and the survival of the United States' high-technology market share in an
increasingly competitive global technology market).
6. Colloquy, supra note 5, at 325.
7. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.
8. Market power is the ability to control prices and competition in the relevant market for the
goods in question. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).
9. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.2.
10. Conduct is considered anticompetitive if it restricts competition in the relevant market.
Anticompetitive conduct, among other things, is prohibited by the Sherman Act, which was enacted
in 1890 and is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Section 1 prohibits anticompetitive conduct by
providing that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 2 also prohibits anticompetitive conduct in the form of monopolizing. Section 2 provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
II. See E.L du Pont, 351 U.S. at 380.
12. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, §§ 3.21-3.3.
13. Id. § 3.2.1.
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from the inception of the antitrust laws and consequently has welldeveloped principles. 4
The second market is the technology market. To most people, the
term "technology" is used to describe machines and processes that are
too complicated for them to understand."i The formal definition is that
"technologies are tools or tool systems by which we transform parts of
our environment, derived from human knowledge, to be used for human
purposes."' 6 The IP Guidelines do not provide their own definition for
technology. However, they do define a technology market as a market
comprised of the actual intellectual property that is being licensed and
any technologies that are considered close substitutes." This technology
market is defined to determine whether a licensor of intellectual property
has market power which would enable anticompetitive conduct.' 8 In
addition, technology market shares are used to determine whether the
parties to the license fall within a "safety zone" created by the IP
Guidelines to protect licensing arrangements in which the licensor and
licensee combined have less than twenty percent of the market for the
technology or goods that are the subject of the agreement. 9
The third market is the innovation market. Innovation has been
defined as "'a process that begins with an invention, proceeds with the
development of the invention, and results in the introduction of a new
product, process or service to the marketplace.""'2 An innovation market
is composed of any firms that have the assets or ability to research and
develop a particular type of technology."' If the participants to a
proposed licensing agreement collectively have a significant share of an
innovation market in a particular technology, the DOJ may challenge the
licensing agreement to preserve the existence of competitors in that
technology.'

14. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied,479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
15. TORNATZKY & FLEISCHER, supra note 1, at 9.
16. Id. at 10 (emphasis removed).

17. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.2.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 4.3.
20. Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Technological Change:An Overview,
in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 1, 18 n.3 (Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds.,
1991) (quoting Keith L. Edwards & Theodore J. Gordon, Characterizationof Innovations Introduced
on the U.S. Market in 1982, The Futures Group, prepared for the U.S. Small Business Administration
under contract no. SBA-6050-OA-82, Mar. 1984).
21. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
22. Id.
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This Note argues that the IP Guidelines fail to provide adequately
for the difficulties present in defining relevant technology and innovation
markets. Part II provides the background on how intellectual property
and antitrust work together to promote innovation and competition. Part
III summarizes the basic assumptions concerning intellectual property and
antitrust that govern the DOJ's analysis. Part IV presents the problems
in using a technology market to determine whether an intellectual
property licensing restraint is anticompetitive. This Part also shows that
greater predictability and consistency may be achieved by analyzing the
associated goods markets instead of the technology market. Part V
analyzes the problems in defining an innovation market to challenge a
proposed licensing agreement or merger. Part VI concludes that the IP
Guidelines create more confusion than predictability by requiring that
technology and innovation markets--two markets in addition to the
relatively more familiar goods market-be considered by practitioners
when structuring intellectual property licensing agreements.
II.

THE INTERSECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST LAW

A.

Intellectual PropertyRights

Intellectual property generally embodies patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret rights.23 Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution gives Congress the power to protect inventors and authors
to foster innovation and the production of original works. 24 Patent rights
are granted to those inventors who have a novel, non-obvious, and useful
product or process.25 In return for disclosure of the invention, the patent
confers the exclusive right to use the invention for twenty years from the
date of filing of the patent application.26 Copyright protection is granted

23. The IP Guidelines specifically exclude the antitrust enforcement of trademarks:
Although the same general antitrust principles that apply to other forms of intellectual
property apply to trademarks as well, these [IP] Guidelines deal with technology transfer
and innovation-related issues that typically arise with respect to patents, copyrights, trade
secrets, and know-how agreements, rather than with product-differentiation issues that
typically arise with respect to trademarks.
Id. § I n.l.
24. "Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by

securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-03 (1994).

26. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
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to the authors of original works of expression, but the protection does not
extend to the underlying ideas of the work. 7 Protection lasts for the

author's life plus fifty years after the author's death. z While copyright
protection may not normally invoke visions of high technology, recent
developments in the protection of computer programs has infused high
technology into the realm of copyrights.29 Trade secrets are not the
subject of any federal
statutes, but are generally protected by state or
30
common law rights.
B. Antitrust and Its Goals
The goals of antitrust law are more widely disputed than those of
intellectual property. The only concept that the holders of opposing views
of antitrust policy would probably agree upon is that the antitrust laws
are concerned with monopolies, monopolists, and monopoly power. One
commentator has noted that monopoly power results in three basic
economic harms to society: allocative inefficiency, transfer of power
from the consumer to the owner of the monopoly, and productive
inefficiency. 31 First, allocative inefficiency results when the monopolist
redirects resources from productive purposes which society desires to
purposes which consumers value less.32 These excess resources are
available to the monopolist because a monopolist naturally produces less

than demand in order to take economic advantage of the decrease in
supply that the monopoly causes. 33 This dissatisfaction with the
34
allocation of resources results in a reduction of society's total wealth.

27. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). This section also has separate provisions for joint works
(§ 302(b)), anonymous works (§ 302 (c)), and works for hire (§ 302(c)).
29. Although the Copyright Office has been accepting computer program copyright
registrations since 1964, only in 1980 did Congress amend 17 U.S.C. § 101 to include the definition
that a .'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in
a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Since section 101 has
been amended, courts have recognized that computer programs may be protected by the copyright
laws. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting
that defendant's computer program, the subject of a tying arrangement inquiry, was protected by a
copyright), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985). Computer programs may also be patented, as long as
there is unique and non-obvious post solution activity with the result of the computer program. See,
e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
30. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 3, § 3A[l].
31. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original andPrimaryConcern ofAntitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72-80 (1982).
32. Id. at 72-73.
33. Id. at 72.
34. Id. at 72-73.
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Second, power is transferred from the consumer to the monopolist by
virtue of the actual transfer of wealth." "[C]onsumers become poorer
while the monopolist becomes richer."3 6 Third, monopolies may result
in productive inefficiency because firms with monopoly power have no
incentive to become efficient or cost-effective, and may actually forestall
investment into research and development ("R&D").37 Some of these
inefficiencies, however, may be countered by a firm's effort to be costeffective and competitive while striving for monopoly status.38
The point of contention between the opposing views of antitrust
policy is whether the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent these
economic harms, or to prevent other harms. One view of antitrust policy
believes that Congress intended only to protect consumers from those
monopolies which artificially restrain trade and lead to higher consumer
prices.39 This consumer welfare goal is achieved by maximizing
economic efficiency 4 and giving firms "a free rein" to compete.4
Under this approach, regardless of what the other effects of the conduct
in question may be, as long as competition is increased, the conduct will
be found to lead to economic efficiency
and will not be successfully
42
challenged by the antitrust laws.
The opposing view of antitrust policy deals with the other effects of
the conduct in question which the efficiency approach deliberately
ignores in the quest for economic efficiency and the preservation of
consumer welfare. This approach recognizes that the antitrust laws may
be used to further social goals such as the redistribution of income, the

35. Id. at 74.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 78-79.
38. Id.

39. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the PerSe andRule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust
Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 686 (1991); see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 228 (D.C. Cit. 1986) (Bork, J.) (noting that the accepted policy goal of the
antitrust laws is consumer welfare), cert. denied,479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Robert H. Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 10-11 (1966) (noting that the
congressional record "conclusively [establishes] that the legislative intent underlying the Sherman
Act was that courts should be guided exclusively by consumer welfare and the economic criteria
which that value premise implies").
40. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goalsof Antitrust. Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA.L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1977) (noting that economic efficiency is defined as
"the maximization of the value of total output. This value can be maximized only if firms are
supplying goods and services in accord with consumer preferences and minimizing production costs

in so doing." (footnote omitted)).
41. Piraino, supra note 39, at 686.
42. See Bork, supra note 39, at 11-12.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

7

Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1995], Art.
HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.10
24.475

encouragement of small businesses, the favoring of decentralized

incremental decision-making over public large scale decision-making, and
the favoring of economic transactions that are neutral towards minorities.43 Proponents of the opposing economic efficiency view consider
these social objectives as equity goals that are not in the realm of
economic analysis 44 or the intent of Congress.45
C.

Do Antitrust and Intellectual Property Goals Conflict?

On their faces, antitrust and intellectual property laws seem totally
at odds with each other, for if the property protected by intellectual
property laws is the only one of its kind, the property may very well
confer significant market power and potential for economic abuse.4 6
However, a thorough analysis of the underlying reasoning behind each
set of laws reveals that both intellectual property privileges and antitrust
statutes share the common goal of increasing competition and innovation.47 The intellectual property laws increase competition by using the
exclusive use privilege as an incentive to produce innovative and original
products and works. 48 The antitrust laws are aimed at agreements and
monopolies that lead to lower economic efficiency and ultimately to
higher consumer prices and restriction of innovation. 49 Furthermore, the
grantees of intellectual property monopolies are not immune from the
antitrust laws,50 and owners of intellectual property rights, most notably

43. Elzinga, supra note 40, at 1193-94; see also Lande, supra note 31, at 69.
44. Elzinga, supra note 40, at 1192.
45. Bork, supra note 39, at 11 ("The rules of law which Congress foresaw are inconsistent
with any value premise other than consumer welfare."). But see Elzinga, supra note 40, at 1191 n.2
(noting that the policy goals of the Sherman Act are unclear at best and that since there is no
consensus in the congressional record that efficiency is the only goal, there is room for the
interpretation that social goals were also the purpose of the antitrust laws) (citing H. THORELLI, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955)).
46. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
47. Id. (noting that "the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at
encouraging innovation, industry and competition"); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861,
876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See generally FTC Enforcement Hearings Turn to Intellectual Property
Policy Issues, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1741, at 670-73 (Dec. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter FTC Hearings on IP Policy] (discussing the relationship between antitrust and
intellectual property).
48. See IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.

49. Colloquy, supra note 5, at 333.
50. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("The patent system... is not an 'exception to' the antitrust laws...."), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 821 (1984).
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patents, may be subject to severe consequences for misusing their
privileges. 1

m1.
A.

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE

IP GUIDELINES

StandardAntitrust Analysis of Intellectual Property

The IP Guidelines first state that standard antitrust analysis applies
to intellectual property agreements.52 The IP Guidelines acknowledge
that there are significant differences between tangible property and
intellectual property, including, but not limited to, the fact that intellectual property is easier to misappropriate and that the purpose, extent, and
duration of intellectual property rights are different. 3 Despite these
differences, the IP Guidelines regard the guiding principles for intellectual property as the same as those for tangible property and state that the
need for a set of different antitrust laws does not exist. 4
B. IntellectualProperty and Market Power
Section 2.2 of the IP Guidelines states that the mere possession of
intellectual property does not confer market power.5 The IP Guidelines
recognize that although the intellectual property right grants the privilege
of exclusive use of the technology that is the subject of the grant, there
often are substitutes that compete with, and thereby eliminate or reduce
consumer dependance on the protected technology.5 6 Additionally, "[i]f
a patent or other form of intellectual property does confer market power,
that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws."5" Judge
Learned Hand expressed a similar concept in United States v. Aluminum
Co. ofAmerica ("Alcoa"). 8 Although Alcoa did not involve intellectual
property, Judge Hand recognized that

51. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488,491 (1942) ("[A] patent affords
no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant, and the use of it to suppress competition ... may
deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity to restrain an alleged infringement by one who
isa competitor." (citations omitted)).
52. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.1.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 2.2. See generally William Montgomery, Note, The PresumptionofEconomic Power
for Patentedand Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLIUM. L. REv. 1140 (1985).
56. IP GUIDEIrNES, supra note 4, § 2.2.

57. Id.
58. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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[a] single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although,
the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the
[Sherman] Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very
forces which it is its prime object to foster ......
C. Intellectual PropertyLicensing is Procompetitive
The last principle is that intellectual property licensing is generally
procompetitive and that even restraints in licenses can serve
procompetitive purposes.6" This principle recognizes that often, for the
efficient conversion of intellectual property from concept to production,
transfer of the property may be required to firms that have manufacturing
6
and production facilities which complement the intellectual property. '
The IP Guidelines adopt the view that intellectual property licensing
promotes the efficient exploitation of new technology that will lead to
new products and lower production costs.62 This tends to increase the
value of intellectual property to its owners and even creates an incentive
to create new technology by greater research and development investment.63

Underlying each of these basic principles set forth in the IP
Guidelines is the understanding that, in order to implement them, the
relevant market must first be accurately determined. "Market definition
is the key pillar to antitrust theory and enforcement policy. In the
absence of market power, practically every form of business behavior,
other than price fixing and its economic equivalents, is legal. ' "
Defining technology and innovation markets, however, is significantly
more complex than the IP Guidelines recognize.

59. Id. at 430.
60. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.3.
61. Colloquy, supra note 5, at 334; FTC HearingsProbe CollaborationLeading to Innovation
and Efficiency, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1736, at 513, 514-15 (Nov. 2, 1995)
[hereinafter FTCHearingson Innovation and Efficiency] (comments of Ernest Gellhorn and Thomas
M. Jorde).
62. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.3; Colloquy, supra note 5, at 334.
63. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.3.
64. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Introduction, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS 3, 7 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
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IV.

TECHNOLOGY MARKETS

Technology markets are defined by the EP Guidelines as the actual
intellectual property being licensed and any technology which is a close
substitute to it.6 However, defining close substitutes for technologies
is more difficult than for the goods markets associated with those
technologies. Three basic types of technology licenses may be identified.
The first technology license is the type that consumers use everyday-the
implied license permitting use of some patented technology which is
incorporated into a consumer product. This license is automatically
granted when the consumer buys the product. The implied technology
license will not be specifically discussed in this Note. The IP Guidelines
are least concerned with this type of license, because the end product
may be analyzed without resort to a technology market.66 The second
technology license is of the type in which technology is licensed without
any identifiable end product at the time of the licensing. This type of
licensing may be referred to as raw technology licensing. The last type
of technology licensing is of the type in which technology is licensed for
the manufacture of a known end product. For example, the licensing of
a new patented process for manufacturing paper clips would fall into this
category. This type of licensing may be referred to as specific technology
licensing.
A.

Raw Technology Markets

Consider the following licensing arrangement:
Little, a small pharmaceutical company, has identified a mouse gene
which it believes may lead to a cure for cancer and licenses it to Big
exclusively.67 Big is a large pharmaceutical company that will assist
in the development of a cure. One of the clauses in the license
agreement provides that Big may not enter into agreements with other
companies that want to license and develop technology that may lead
to a cure for cancer. Little has not yet received a patent for its mouse
gene. Big is also involved in its own research and has developed an

65. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.2.

66. Id. § 3.2.2 n.19.
67. An exclusive license grants the sole right to the licensee to use or develop the subject of
the license, but is not equivalent to an assignment of fill ownership. HARRY R. MAYERS & BRIAN
G. BRUNSVOLD, DRAFTING PATENT LIcENsE AGREEMENTS 37-39 (3d ed. 1991). The exclusive
license may be subject to restrictions which the licensor puts in the license agreement. Id.
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enzyme which it believes will lead to a test that will enable doctors to
identify those predisposed to cancer. Both Little and Big will be

working on the cancer cure at the same time with an agreement that
Little will have rights to any new cancer cure technology developed by
Big from the mouse gene.68
In scrutinizing such an agreement for any anticompetitive provisions
under the IP Guidelines, the DOJ will first determine whether to apply
a per se or a rule of reason type analysis69 by establishing if the license
restraint can be expected to result in "an efficiency-enhancing integration
of economic activity."7 If economic efficiency can be expected, the
DOJ will employ a rule of reason analysis and conversely, if no
economic efficiency can be expected, a per se standard will be employed.71
Economic efficiency may be achieved by many different types of
agreements. For example, a licensing agreement in which entities with
complementary resources agree to work together to utilize one party's
intellectual property may be efficiency-enhancing because without the
agreement, the intellectual property would not have been utilized or

68. The general concept of this example is adopted from an agreement between Athena
Neurosciences and Eli Lilly & Company in which Eli Lilly agreed to assist Athena in developing
a cure for Alzheimer's disease from a gene Athena identified in a mouse. See generally Lawrence
M. Fisher, Athena Neurosciences Makes ItselfHeard in Fight Against Alzheimer's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1995, at D8.
69. There are two basic methods of analyzing conduct under the antitrust laws. Piraino, supra
note 39, at 685. Under the rule of reason analysis, only unreasonable restraints of trade will be
deemed to be in violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 689. In evaluating conduct under this method,
courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the agreement, such as conditions before
and after the restraint, the nature and purposes of the restraint, the type of business, and the effects
on competitiveness. Id. This mode of analysis has been criticized for forcing courts to engage in long
and complicated economic inquiry into the effects of the agreement. Id. at 690. The rule of reason
approach is employed extensively by proponents of the efficiency model in that it allows the court
to expunge any procompetitive results of the agreement. Id. at 686.
The per se analysis was created to avoid the prolonged and complicated rule of reason
analysis when conduct was anticompetitive on its face. Id. at 69 1. This approach is attractive because
it not only simplifies litigation, but it provides concrete guidance as to what type of conduct will be
challenged by the DOJ. Id.Per se violations include market division among direct competitors, resale
price restraints, price fixing, and group boycotts. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.4. Recently, with
the appointment of several efficiency model proponents to the federal bench, the per se rule has been
limited to agreements where the only possible result of the restraint is the limitation of output.
Piraino, supra note 39, at 686 n.5, 693.
70. IP GUIDELINES, supranote 4, § 3.4. An efficiency-enhancing integration of activity results
when an owner of intellectual property licenses technology to a licensee which has complementary
production facilities. See supra part III.C.
71. IP GUnDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.4.
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would have cost more resources and money to utilize.72 To determine
whether the licensing agreement will result in an efficiency-producing
integration of activity, the relevant raw technology market must first be
accurately delineated.
1. Delineating the Relevant Raw Technology Market
In delineating the relevant raw technology market, the IP Guidelines
use a procedure similar to the approach used to identify goods markets
in the DOJ's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines").73 This approach consists of identifying "the smallest group of
technologies and goods over which a hypothetical monopolist of those
technologies and goods likely would exercise market power-for
example, by imposing a small but significant and nontransitory price
increase."'74
Therefore, in the Little and Big hypothetical, it is necessary to
determine what is the smallest group of raw technologies in which the
two companies compete. This requires determining whether Little's
mouse and Big's enzyme have similar attributes and are economic
substitutes for each other which compete in the same raw technology
market.
The IP Guidelines' definition for technology substitutes provides
that the DOJ "will regard two technologies as 'comparably efficient' if
'
they can be used to produce close substitutes at comparable costs."75
This definition is similar to the one used to determine product substitutes.
In product substitution situations, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
the test for available economic substitutes is "gauged by the purchase of
competing products for similar uses considering the price, characteristics
and adaptability of the competing commodities."76 In a technological
sense, this type of substitution analysis has been likened to the doctrine
of equivalents in patent infringement suits.77 The doctrine of equivalents

72. See id.
73.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

§§ 1.1-1.4 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
74. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.2.
75. Id. § 3.2.2 n.22. The Merger Guidelines define these alternates as those "which, if available
in unlimited quantities at constant prices, would account for the greatest value of diversion of
demand in response to a 'small but significant and nontransitory' price increase." MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 1.11 n.9.

76. United States v. E. 1.du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1956).
77. Kenneth J.Burchfiel, PatentMisuse andAnttrustReform: "BlessedBe the Tie?",4 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 96 (1991).
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in patent infringement cases provides that if an alleged infringing device
"'performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result,"' the device will be found to be infringing the
patented device. 78 However, applying a price/performance (or
price/characteristics) test for determining substitutes for raw technology,
as the IP Guidelines suggest, will prove to be as elusive to antitrust raw
technology market definitions as the doctrine of equivalents has been in
recent patent cases.
As recently as 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC") has struggled with application of the doctrine of equivalents.
In a split en banc decision, Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,Inc.,
written by Judge Bissel for seven judges, the CAFC practically eliminated the doctrine of equivalents by requiring an element-by-element
comparison of the patented device and the alleged infringing device. 7
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Bennett for four judges,
emphasized that the majority decision was inconsistent with the standard
set forth in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co. 80 In another opinion entitled "Additional Views," Judge Nies (later
Chief Judge), who sided with the majority, conceded that an element-byelement analysis is not mandatory if "[e]lements may be combined.., to
achieve an equivalent element."" t In yet another opinion entitled
"Commentary," Judge Newman, who sided with the dissent, noted that
"[t]he majority can not be oblivious to the in banc weight of its opinion,
or to the muddle of uncertainty that it will cause. 8' 2 In 1989, the CAFC
backed away from the Pennwaltopinion and again embraced the standard
set forth in Graver Tank. "[T]he substitution of an ingredient known to
be an equivalent to that required by the claim presents a classic example
for a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents."83 As
a result of this uncertainty in the CAFC, the doctrine of equivalents has

78. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
79. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,935 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961 (1988).
80. Id. at 940; see also text accompanying note 78.
81. Id. at 949 n.1.

82. Id. at 954.
83. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)).
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become "one of the most complex and unpredictable factors in patent
enforcement. 8 4
Similarly, price/performance comparison of raw technologies will be
difficult and will lead to confusion and more importantly, unpredictability. The following discussions explore these difficulties by applying
the IP Guidelines to the Little and Big example. Price comparisons of
raw technology are treated in less detail than performance comparisons
because the IP Guidelines specifically "recognize that technology often
is licensed in ways that are not readily quantifiable in monetary
terms. 85
a. Price Comparisons of Raw Technology
In the Little and Big example, price is important because a
consumer's decision to purchase the goods produced from Little's
technology or from Big's technology depends not only on the performance equivalency, but also on their relative costs. A consumer that can
buy a product produced from Little's technology for half the price of a
product produced by Big's technology will not turn to the latter's higher
priced product, even if the performance is equivalent. Unfortunately, a
price-based analysis of raw technologies will be difficult to implement;
the IP Guidelines provide no clear guidance on how to calculate the price
paid for raw technology in licensing arrangements.
The price paid for raw technology is difficult to ascertain because
technology is not quantifiable [and] cannot be counted in a simple
manner. Quantification, consisting in measuring the space occupied by
a piece of information, is not adequate because it leaves out the
significanceof the information. More precisely, there exists no measure
of the quantity of information, independent of the use that will be made
of it. As a result, the valuation of information--the benefit which it
affords-depends upon the buyer's
perception, and therefore on the
6
information he already holds.1

In technology licensing, the buyer's perception of the value of the raw

84, Burchfiel, supranote 77, at 94; see also William C. Rooklidge, FederalCircuit Unsettles

Doctrineof Equivalents,NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at C43, C45 (discussing, the CAFC's decision
in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed Cir. 1995), in which the

doctrine of equivalents' element-by-element test again was questioned).
85. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.2.
86, FRANcIS BIDAULT, TECHNOLOGY PRICING 7 (Brian Page & Peter Sherwood trans., 1989)
(endnotes omitted) (second emphasis added).
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technology being acquired is expressed in the license agreement.

Therefore, to ascertain the price paid for raw technology, it is necessary
to assess the value that the parties dealing in the technology attribute to

it by examining license provisions. However, this is difficult because
technology licenses have many non-royalty provisions that are difficult
to evaluate and unquantifiable.8 7
Recall that, in the Little and Big agreement, 8 Big is obligated to
grant to Little any rights to a cure for cancer developed by Big from the
mouse gene in the future. This provision for future technology is called
a grantback (or flowback) clause and enables the licensor to benefit from
any improvements or advancements made by the licensee on the licensed
technology without having to compensate the licensee.8 9 Future technology clauses are common in technology licenses 9 because they enable
licensors to raise capital for R&D and to obtain the benefit of grantback
arrangements.9" Assessing the value of this agreement is difficult
because the technology that Big will grant back to Little does not yet
exist. For example, it is possible that a viable cancer cure may never be
developed from Little's mouse gene or that, assuming other entities have
the capability, someone else may develop a cure first. This alternate cure
can render the Little and Big development useless or may actually

87. In a 1989 survey of 33 licensor contracts and 29 licensee agreements, provisions were
found in the license agreements for technical assistance; sale of plans, technical manuals, and
tooling; design or study of the technology installation; training of staff; sale of equipment ready to
operate in the technology; transfer of patents; assistance in the maintenance of technology
installations; grantback agreements; and sales assistance. Id. at 15. While some of the provisions,
such as the sale of equipment, are easily quantifiable, other non-price incentives are not. Id.
88. See supra part IV.A.
89. Richard E. Caves et al., The Imperfect Marketfor Technology Licenses, 45 OxFoRD BULL.
ECON. & STAT. 249,260 (1983). Grantback and future technology provisions should be distinguished
from clauses that make remuneration contingent on the licensor obtaining a patent or other
certifications which may still be pending at the time the license is executed. See MAYERS &
BRUNSVOLD, supra note 67, at 80-81. Such a provision is generally referred to as a license
contingent on a future event. Id.
The use of a grantback provision in this example should also be distinguished from
evaluation of a grantback provision of a licensing agreement for rule of reason purposes. In this
example, the grantback provision is used to illustrate the difficulty in quantifying the value of a
licensing agreement. The IP Guidelines specifically provide qualitative criteria for evaluating the
grantback provision for a rule of reason analysis. See IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 5.6.
90. In a survey of companies in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom that
routinely license technology, it was found that 62% of the licenses had futurity clauses. Caves et al.,
supra note 89, at 261. Of the companies that had only one dominant product, 80% of the licenses
had futurity clauses. Id. Dominant product firms were defined as those in the survey that had over
600% of their sales due to a single product. Id. at 252.
91. Id. at 260, 263.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss2/10

16

1995]

TECHNOLOGY
AND INNOVATION
MARKETS
Aziz: Defining
Technology
and Innovation
Markets: The DOJ's Antitrust G

preempt any intellectual property rights that Little or Big may have
had,92 leaving them with a valueless grantback agreement. The value of
this grantback agreement may only be determined when the benefits of
the agreement are realized or rendered useless. Although it must be
assumed that Little had some value in mind when it negotiated the
licensing arrangement and grantback clause, the consideration is often in
the form of other unquantifiable arrangements.
For example, in addition to the grantback agreement, assume that
93
Little and Big decided to enter into a cross-licensing arrangement
whereby in return for Little's mouse gene, Big agreed to license its
enzyme technology to Little. Little decided that if the enzyme technology
could be developed into a test for those predisposed to cancer, it would
assist in creating a market for its cancer cure developed from the mouse
gene. Although companies engaging in cross-licensing practices often
consider the two technologies to be of equal value,94 cross-licensing
agreements remain one of the most difficult licensing provisions to
quantify. It is more difficult to assess the price paid for cross-licensed
technology than for regular licensing agreements because now there are
two different technologies to evaluate, each one of which is consideration
for the other. In determining the price for either one of these technologies, it is necessary to evaluate the benefit that the licensee expects to
obtain from the technology it is licensing. This requires an exploration
of the predictions and marketing projections that the licensee made when
deciding to enter into the license agreement.95 These figures, however,
are no more than estimates contingent on the effective development of
a technology and the existence of a market once the technology is
developed into a marketable product.
Furthermore, licensing agreements in high technology areas often
involve the exchange of technical personnel and equipment as remunera-

92. It is possible that another inventor may develop a cure which does not use Little's patented
technology, but may still accomplish the same functions that Little's mouse gene is being used to
develop. Furthermore, if Little's mouse gene technology is not kept secret, another company may
develop a cure from it on their own. See, e.g., Jerry E. Bishop, Plan May Blow Lid OffSecret Gene
Research, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1994, at Bl.

93. "A 'cross-license' is a transaction in which (1) a license is granted from Party A to Party
B and (2) at least part of the consideration provided by Party B is license to Party A under patents
[or other technology] of Party B." MAYERS & BRUNSVOLD, supra note 67, at 33.
94. BIDAULT, supra note 86, at 30.
95. LICENSING ExEcUTIVES SOC'Y, COMMENTS ON ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, at 12 [hereinafter
LES COMMENTS] (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). These comments were written in response
to the first draft of the IP Guidelines, which was released for public comment on August 11, 1994.

Id. at 10.
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tion. % The Little and Big agreement has such a provision. In addition
to Big obtaining the mouse gene for development, Big has agreed to
assist Little in the development of the same technology. Big may provide
everything from laboratory equipment and assistance to actual marketing
assistance for the end product if it is superior in that area as well.
Evaluating the price paid for these services suffers from the same
problems as the other non-royalty provisions.
All of this is not to say that no value can be assigned to the various
non-royalty license provisions that are present in the Little and Big
agreement. Fees may be determined for each of several categories of
non-royalty provisions in a raw technology license agreement. For
example, engineering fees may be determined for situations where Big
supplies to Little genetic engineering skills specific to the mouse gene
technology. These fees depend on the qualifications and expertise of
Big's personnel. 7 Little might also pay Big technical assistance fees for
technical assistance provided by Big to help Little utilize the technology." Consulting fees also may be paid for Big's financial, legal, and
marketing advice concerning the use of the technology.99 In addition,
of course, there would be monetary royalties paid based on some agreed
upon measure such as profits or sales.
In practice, however, the licensing agreement is rarely ever separated
into these fees and royalties. Instead, most non-royalty services related
to the technology are bundled together with the royalty provisions and
have one value assigned to the whole package, thus avoiding the
difficulty of having to individually set a price for each provision of the
technology license."t By bundling everything together, however, it
becomes impossible to isolate what value must be assigned to the
technology in question, cross-licensed technologies, and related nontechnology services. Furthermore, one commentator has even suggested
that even if the individual values for each type of remuneration in a
technology licensing agreement could be obtained, "the number of
variables in each transaction would compound the margin of error,

96. BIDAULT, supra note 86, at 15. In the study of licensors and licensees, technical assistance
was a part of approximately 85% of both licensor and licensee agreements. Id. Training of staff was
found in 78.8% of licensor agreements and 69% of licensee agreements. Id.
97. Id. at 32.
98. Id. at 33.
99. Id.

100. Id. at 36.
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rendering the ultimate... figure[s] functionally useless."''
Therefore, whether the Little and Big technologies are similarly
priced is as difficult to ascertain as the products that may be developed
from the raw technologies and the prices that those technologies and
products would cost. The IP Guidelines recognize this difficulty and
attempt to provide an alternative solution: the relevant market will then
be delineated by "identifying othertechnologies and goods which buyers
would substitute at a cost comparable to that of using the licensed
technology."' 0 2 Unfortunately, it is unclear how this alternative inquiry
differs from the original approach. Assuming that the price of the "other"
technology is determinable, this alternative analysis still requires a
comparison of the other technologies' price to a price for using the
licensed technology. If the price for the licensed technology were
quantifiable, this alternative would not be necessary. Furthermore, as the
following discussion illustrates, a comparison of the performance of one
technology to another, an integral part of determining a substitute
technology, is also difficult for raw technologies.
b. Performance Comparisons of Raw Technology
Applying the IP Guidelines' performance test for raw technology
substitutes to the Little and Big example raises more questions than it
answers. It appears at first glance that although both Little and Big are
pharmaceutical companies, they are in a vertical relationship' 3 since
Little is using Big for technical assistance in its development of the
mouse gene into a cure for cancer in humans. This situation mimics
license agreements in which a small innovator licenses technology to a
company that has the capability to manufacture and market a good from

101. LES COMMENTS, supra note 95, at 11; see also George D. Corey & Edward Kahn, How
to Successfully Negotiate Reasonable Royalty Rates for Licensing Bioproducts, GENETIC
ENGINEERING NEws, Sept. 1, 1995, at 4, 38 (discussing the various methods of determining royalty
rates in bioproducts licensing and the difficulties associated with each method).
102. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.2 (emphasis added).
103. Vertical relationships are of the type where the licensor and licensee are in a seller-buyer
relationship or are generally in complimentary levels of the product chain, such as that of inventor
and manufacturer who may commercialize and manufacture the inventor's technology. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). Horizontal relationships are those in which both the
licensor and licensee are potential or actual competitors in the market for the goods or technologies
that are the subject of the license. Id. at 334. Although the IP Guidelines recognize that whether a

relationship is horizontal or vertical is not always dispositive of anticompetitive conduct, they
maintain that the type of relationship does aid in the determination of anticompetitive conduct,
because licenses between horizontal competitors may lead to a reduction in competition which would
have occurred in absence of the license. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.3.
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the technology. Such a relationship is a classic example of a vertical
relationship
which results in an efficiency-producing integration of
4
activity.'
However, as neither Little nor Big's technology has yet been
commercialized, it is difficult to determine what goods they will produce
and it is impossible to determine what goods consumers will find to have
similar performance attributes. It cannot be determined whether a mouse
gene will provide the same performance as a cancer enzyme until one
knows what products the technologies can be used to develop. For
example, it is possible that Big's enzyme technology will, as expected,
yield a marketable test for the identification of people predisposed to
cancer. It is equally possible that Little's mouse gene technology will fail
to find a cure for human cancer and will instead develop into a cancer
identification test similar to Big's. In this situation, Little and Big would
wind up in a horizontal relationship, competing in the same technology
market for cancer predisposition tests. The likelihood that Little and Big
will become potential competitors is as difficult to predict as whether
they are currently actual competitors in the technology market. Such
factors cannot be determined until the mouse gene and enzyme technology are developed and marketing is aimed at a particular group of
consumers.
Performance attributes of raw technology are also difficult to assess
because technology and its relevant market are constantly changing.
Unlike goods, technology is characterized as dynamic"0 5 because every
time new technology is developed, the starting knowledge increases and
new knowledge or innovations may now be hatched by building on the
initial technology. The IP Guidelines attempt to analyze dynamic
technology markets by utilizing the Merger Guidelines ap07
proach' ° --which is optimized to analyze static market systems1

104. See supra part III.C.

105. There are two types of economic market systems: dynamic and static. ROD CooMBs ET
AL., EcoNoMIcs AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 15 (1987). The static efficiency of a system is

defined as one in which the initial conditions are almost always constant for a relatively extended

period of time. Id. In this situation, the system is constantly reacting to small changes in order to
maintain the equilibrium of the system. Id. In dynamic systems, the initial conditions are not constant
and each time the system reacts to maintain equilibrium, the initial conditions change, requiring

additional changes. Id.
106. IP GuiDELMES, supra note 4, § 3.2.
107. See CooMBs ET AL., supra note 105, at 14-15; see also Jorde & Teece, supra note 64, at

7-8.
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as goods

or products.0

s

Unfortunately,

economists

have

concluded that static market analysis cannot be used to define and predict
dynamic systems.' 9 Therefore, economically, the IP Guidelines are not
well suited to defining dynamic markets such as a raw technology
market."t 0
Moreover, in a practical sense, constantly changing technologies
often render prior technologies useless by virtue of their superior
performance."' However, this does not mean that the older technology
is no longer a viable performance substitute for the new technology. The
modem computer industry is a good example of how quickly performance attributes can change in a particular technology with unpredictable
results on the technology market. For example, a new microprocessor
which is only twice as fast as the chip it replaces may not immediately
make an impact in the technology market because manufacturers are
reluctant to switch to the faster chip until they can be sure that consumers are ready to replace all of their current equipment."' In this
situation, the new chip is not a technology substitute for the old one
because the performance attributes are not considered similar enough to
make manufacturers and consumers substitute one chip for the other.
However, if the new chip is ten times faster than the old chip, consumers
may readily switch, despite the cost of new equipment, because of the
significant performance gain. In this situation, the two technologies will

108. Product and goods markets are part of a static efficiency system because the initial
conditions or productive capacity, raw materials, and capital are constant. See CooMBs ET AL., supra
note 105, at 14-15. When a condition changes in the system, such as a participant in the system
artificially raising prices, the entire system reacts to regain the equilibrium condition. Id. This
reaction generally produces no change in the initial conditions. Id.
109. Id. at 15 ("Mhe existence of these two types of efficiency implies that it is not possible
to analyse a situation characterised by dynamic efficiency in terms of the variables and parameters
required to describe static efficiency.").
110. Technology markets will be difficult to analyze using methods developed for static systems
because technology markets have no natural economic supply and demand information which can
be utilized in the determination of the necessary equilibrium point of the market. BIDAULT, supra
note 86, at 7. This is because technology is generally developed with a specific need in mind and
transferred only after the technology has been developed and an opportunity arises which may enable
the owner of the technology to benefit by licensing it. Id. The exception to this is private research
firms and engineering consultants whose business is the development of technology for others. Id.
Consequently, one economist has concluded that "[a]s information, technology offers a specific
nature of supply and demand that rules out any analogy with products." Id.
11I. Edmund L. Andrews, Technology MonopoliesAre Big, But Often Brittle,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
26, 1995, § 4, at 6; see also FTC Hearings on Innovation and Efficiency, supra note 61, at 515
(comments of Thomas M. Jorde) (discussing how the fast pace of changing technology and
innovation requires companies to remain prepared to market the rapidly emerging technologies).
112. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 64, at 8; see also Andrews, supra note 111, § 4, at 6.
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at first be substitutes for each other, and then the new chip will
eventually replace the old one entirely. Replacement may be quite rapid
in some technologies, and in the computer industry, sudden replacement
of technology is considered normal."t 3
2. Substitution in the Rule of Reason Analysis
Consequently, determination of the relevant raw technology market
is difficult at best. Without an accurate delineation of the relevant raw
technology market, no determination can be made as to whether the
licensing agreement incorporates any efficiency-enhancing integration of
economic activity. As a result, it is likely that the IP Guidelines will
resort to a rule of reason type analysis, as this is the preferred mode of
analysis when any market information is lacking." 4
Applying a rule of reason type analysis to the Little and Big
example will illustrate that problems continue to exist even after the raw
technology market definition hurdle is crossed. Specifically, this example
contains a provision that may be construed as an exclusive dealing
provision. The restraint between Little and Big provides that Big may not
help develop any other technologies that may lead to a cancer cure. For
exclusive dealing provisions, the IP Guidelines provide that
[i]n determining whether an exclusive dealing arrangement is likely to
reduce competition in a relevant market, the [DOJ] will take into
account the extent to which the arrangement (1) promotes the exploitation and development of the licensor's technology and (2)
anticompetitively forecloses the exploitation and development of, or
otherwise constrains competition among, competing technologies."'
Applying the first part of this inquiry, it appears that the Little and
Big restraint has certain procompetitive characteristics. Their agreement
ensures that Big will do its best to develop the technology that Little is
licensing, as opposed to diluting its resources on other technologies. In
return, Big acquires the privileges inherent in the exclusive license. If a
successful product is developed from the mouse gene technology, then
Big will profit from the license, subject only to the provisions requiring
some sort of payment to Little.
However, part two of this inquiry becomes difficult if Big is not the
only company capable of developing technologies for the cure of cancer

113. Andrews, supra note 111, § 4, at 6.
114. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.4.
115. Id. § 5.4.
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by virtue of its superior facilities and personnel. For example, assume
that a third company, Medium, has its own raw technology which is
reasonably expected to lead to a cure for cancer. Medium requires access
to Big's superior facilities to develop its raw technology. Medium's raw
technology consists of a process for the identification of a chemical
imbalance that, if corrected, may be a cure for cancer. The presence of
Medium raises the question of whether its chemical technology has the
same price/performance attributes as Little's and Big's respective genes
and enzyme technologies. This determination is crucial to a finding of
anticompetitive conduct by Little, because it is necessary to ascertain if
Medium is in the relevant raw technology market for a cancer cure. If
Medium is included in the raw technology market-i.e., Medium's raw
technology is an economic substitute-then the benefits of the licensing
restraint may be considered anticompetitive, since the restraint "forecloses the exploitation and development of"11 6 Medium's technology. Such
a determination hinges on a finding that Medium's chemical technology
is in the same raw technology market and unfortunately suffers from the
same substitution problems as those covering Little's and Big's
respective technologies.
Thus, the subjects of modem raw technology licenses are not likely
to be amenable to a determination of the technology market in which
they compete. It is difficult to compare the performance attributes and the
price paid for these raw technologies. Absent such performance/price
information, it is impossible to determine what technologies consumers
will find to be acceptable substitutes, and consequently, what raw
technologies should be included in the relevant raw technology market.
For those technologies that do not have end-products, the IP Guidelines
should not be applied until a product is developed for which a goods
market can be defined using conventional standards of antitrust market
definition.
The only guidance, other than the general provisions for defining
technology markets, that the IP Guidelines provide for raw technologies
only serves to undermine its predictability goals. "For new technologies,
the Agencies generally will use the best available information to estimate
market acceptance over a two-year period, beginning with commercial
introduction."".7 Unfortunately, this provision will only force parties
structuring raw technology licensing agreements to spend time and funds

116. Id.
117. Id. § 3.2.2.
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attempting to predict what the DOJ will estimiate as technology market
shares for technologies that do not yet have identifiable end products.
B.

Specific Technology Markets

The specific technology market does not suffer from the same
difficulties in defining a relevant market as a raw technology market
because the end product for specific technologies is identifiable. The end
product may be used to determine what specific technologies may be
used to create substitute products. Unfortunately, the IP Guidelines do
not differentiate between raw technologies and specific technologies.
Additionally, the question arises as to whether it is necessary to define
a specific technology market if an end product is identifiable.
With the contemporary widespread use of technology licenses which
include non-royalty provisions and contracts for future technology,"8
the proper market to analyze is the goods market that is associated with
the specific technology licenses. It is unnecessary to pursue an esoteric
technology market definition when a satisfactory goods market from
which conventional antitrust analysis will provide satisfactory results is
present.
For instance, Example 2 of the IP Guidelines" 9 defines both a

118. See, e.g., Neal Boudette, Apple Embarks on GlobalLicense Plan, PC WK., July 25, 1994,
at 20, 108 (reporting the plans of Apple Computer Inc. to begin a large scale technology licensing
program to allow software and hardware companies to manufacture Apple's Macintosh brand
computer clones and compatible software); Lawrence M. Fisher, Isis in Alliance with GermanDrug
Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at D4 (reporting on the agreement between Isis Pharmaceuticals
Inc. and Boehringer Ingelheim International G.m.b.H. in which Isis licensed biotechnology for future
development by the two companies); Lawrence M. Fisher, Athena NeurosciencesMakes ItselfHeard
in FightAgainst Alzheimer's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at D8 (reporting on the agreement between
Athena Neurosciences Inc. and Eli Lilly & Company in which Athena licensed a mouse gene to Eli
Lilly for the development of a possible cure for Alzheimer's disease); Ira Sager, IBM Knows What
to Do with a Good Idea: Sell It, Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1994, at 72 (reporting on IBM's plans to no
longer exclusively use its own technology and to engage in an aggressive licensing plan).
119. IP Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.2.2. Example 2 provides the following:
Situation: Firms Alpha and Beta independently develop different patented process
technologies to manufacture the same off-patent drug for the treatment of a particular
disease. Before the firms use their technologies internally or license them to third parties,
they announce plans jointly to manufacture the drug, and to assign their manufacturing
processes to the new manufacturing venture. Many firms are capable of using and have
the incentive to use the licensed technologies to manufacture and distribute the drug; thus,
the market for drug manufacturing and distribution is competitive. One of the Agencies
is evaluating the likely competitive effects of the planned venture.
Discussion: The Agency would analyze the competitive effects of the proposed joint
venture by first defining the relevant markets in which competition may be affected and
then evaluating the likely competitive effects of the joint venture in the identified
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technology market and a goods market to analyze the proposed licensing
arrangement. This arrangement may be classified as a specific technology
agreement, as the end product-the drug for treating the disease-is
specifically identifiable. In analyzing the goods market, the DOJ
concludes that it is unlikely to substantially affect the manufacture and
distribution of the drug produced by the specific technology. The DOJ
then expresses concern that the two parties to the license may raise prices
of the drug produced by their technology. Consequently, the DOJ decides
to delineate a technology market. However, by the facts of the situation,
it is unlikely that the two companies would be able to successfully raise
prices because the DOJ notes that many firms compete in the manufacture and distribution of the drug. If the two companies raise prices,
consumers would turn to the other manufacturers of the drug or other
drugs which combat the same disease. Analyzing a technology market
does not reveal anything new that could not be gleaned from the related
goods market. A technology market delineation is not even necessary if
no competing manufacturers of the drug exist. In that situation, an
analysis of the related goods market would reveal the lack of competitors, and conventional goods antitrust analysis would govern the licensing
agreement.
In fact, almost any technology that has a related end product can be
analyzed by defining a relevant goods market instead of a market to
define the specific technology. In this respect, the IP Guidelines only
serve to complicate antitrust analysis of technology licenses by introducing another market which is unnecessary to an adequate analysis. This
undermines the predictability goals of the IP Guidelines by forcing
parties who are structuring technology licenses to undertake an expensive

markets. In this example, the structural effect of the joint venture in the relevant goods

market for the manufacture and distribution of the drug is unlikely to be significant,
because many firms in addition to the joint venture compete in that market. The joint
venture might, however, increase the prices of the drug produced using Alpha's or Beta's
technology by reducing competition in the relevant market for technology to manufacture
the drug.
The Agency would delineate a technology market in which to evaluate likely
competitive effects of the proposed joint venture. The Agency would identify other
technologies that can be used to make the drug with levels of effectiveness and cost per
dose comparable to that of the technologies owned by Alpha and Beta. In addition, the
Agency would consider the extent to which competition from other drugs that are
substitutes for the drug produced using Alpha's and Beta's technology would limit the
ability of a hypothetical monopolist that owned both Alpha's and Beta's technology to
raise its price.

Id. (citation omitted).
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and extracurricular analysis in an attempt to predict what action the DOJ
may take. The goods markets should be analyzed for any technology
license for which an end product can be readily identified.
C. Summary
Technology markets are difficult to define utilizing the IP Guidelines. In raw technology markets--markets which have no identifiable
end products associated with the licensed technology--problems exist in
the identification of cost and performance substitutes. Identification of
cost and performance substitutes is not only vital for delineation of the
raw technology market, but also for application of common antitrust
analysis methods such as the rule of reason. Consequently, for raw
technology license agreements, the IP Guidelines do not achieve their
predictability goals, because parties preparing raw technology licenses
will be unable to define raw technology markets with the confidence
necessary to structure licensing agreements.
In specific technology markets--markets for which an end product
is associated with the licensed technology-it is unnecessary to resort to
definition of a complicated technology market. By analyzing the goods
market associated with the licensed technology, adequate results may be
obtained. In specific technology markets, the IP Guidelines will only
serve to confuse parties preparing intellectual property agreements by
forcing them to consider the technology market in addition to the
traditional goods market.
V. INNOVATION MARKETS
The IP Guidelines also include the determination of innovation
markets to determine whether to challenge a proposed licensing
agreement. Innovation market analysis is not a new concept,12 although the DOJ's IP Guidelines is one of the first attempts at formally
defining an innovation market.'2 1 "An innovation market consists of the

120. George A. Hay, Innovations in Antitrust Enforcement, 64 ANTITRUST LJ.7, 8-10 (1995);
Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 20-22 (1995). For a general overview of innovation and its protection in the
United States and Canada, see Symposium, Promoting & Protecting Innovation in a Changing
World: Canada/U.S.Concerns and Opportunities,21 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 1 (1995).
121. The actual legality of an innovation market has been questioned by one commentator.
Robert J. Hoemer, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles?, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 50-55
(1995). Hoemer argues that an innovation market is not a legal market for antitrust analysis because
innovation is not an accepted line of commerce under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id; see 15 U.S.C.
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research and development directed to particular new or improved goods
or processes,
and the close substitutes for that research and develop122
ment."

Innovation markets will be utilized in situations in which licensing
arrangements have competitive effects on innovation. 23 The impact of
these licensing arrangements may be on the development of goods that
do not yet exist within the same market, or even on the development of
goods in markets where there exists little actual or likely competition. 24 The IP Guidelines turn to innovation markets because the DOJ
believes that some competitive effects of licensing agreements cannot be
adequately addressed by an analysis of goods and technology markets.' 2
However, there are significant difficulties in attempting to define an
innovation market. The IP Guidelines acknowledge these difficulties and

consequently provide that "the Agencies will delineate an innovation
market only when the capabilities to engage in the relevant research and
development can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics
of specific firms.' 2 6 But what are the "specialized assets" that are
related to innovation? Furthermore, who are the innovators whose
specialized research and development assets will be scrutinized?
Unfortunately, as the following sections illustrate, the IP Guidelines

rely on a misleading measure of innovation--the capability to engage in
R&D. 127 There are few characteristics upon which innovation depends,

§ 18 (1994). For the purposes of this Note, I will assume that innovation markets are recognized in
antitrust analysis. See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, The Use ofInnovation Markets: A
Rep!)' to Ha) Rapp, and Hoerner, 64 ANTTRUST L.J. 75, 78-80 (1995) (Mr. Gilbert is a former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics of the DOJ and chaired the Antitrust Division task
force that authored the IP Guidelines. Mr. Sunshine is a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Mergers of the DOJ.) (defending the existence of an innovation market under § 7 of the Clayton
Act).
122. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Monitoring R&D is not a new concept. Congress has expressed an interest in R&D by
passing the National Cooperative Research and Production Act ("NCRPA"). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 430106 (1994). The NCRPA makes effects on R&D part of the rule of reason analysis. 15 U.S.C. § 4302;
see also The Committee on Antitrust and Trade Regulations, Association of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., Comments on the DraftAntitrust Guidelinesfor the Licensing and Acquisition ofIntellectual
Propery, 49 REC. 1014, 1019 (1994); cf.United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271,
280-81 (1964) (finding that an acquisition in the electrical conductor market was illegal because,
among other things, it would reduce R&D competition).
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and evaluating R&D capability to obtain a measure of innovative
capacity will lead to inaccurate definitions of innovative markets, because
R&D is often a poor indicator of innovative output or capability.'28
Additionally, the IP Guidelines may have difficulty in identifying the
firms which are capable of innovation.
A.

MeasuringInnovative Output and Capability

Measuring innovative output and capability accurately is difficult at
best.'29 Consider the following situation:
Assume two companies of equal size, Rich and Poor, are engaged in
the research and development of ceramic materials for use in automotive engines. Each year, Rich spends $10,000,000 on R&D and
commits one-half of its employees to its R&D program. Poor, on the
other hand, spends only $100,000 on R&D, most of which was used to
acquire a super-computer, and only five percent of its employees are
actively engaged in R&D projects. Rich has obtained one patent related
to ceramic engine materials in the last three years, while Poor has
received four in the same period.
In determining the innovative capabilities of firms such as Rich and
Poor, the IP Guidelines recommend measuring the R&D assets of each
firm. 30 Research and development assets of companies are defined by
a measurement of the capital spent on research or the percentage of
employees involved in such work.' The drawback of measuring R&D
budgets is that it only evaluates the resources expended in trying to
produce output and is not indicative of the output itself. 32 For example, if it is assumed for the moment that patents are indicative of
innovative output, measuring Rich's R&D budget fails to reveal that Rich
has a small share of the innovative market. Conversely, Poor's R&D
budget is relatively small by ceramic engine manufacturing standards and
fails to reveal that Poor has achieved a greater share of the innovation
market than its budget suggests.
A measure of the R&D labor force is similarly inaccurate because
it fails to account for the services provided by research and laboratory

128. Rapp, supra note 120, at 33-36.

129. Acs & Audretsch, supra note 20, at 3.
130. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
131. Acs & Audretsch, supra note 20, at 3.
132. Id.
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materials which are often as important as the labor force utilizing
them. 33 For example, measuring Rich's R&D labor force would lead
to the conclusion that innovation is rampant at Rich. However, that is not
the case, since they only have one patent. Likewise, Poor's employees
have produced four patents with a fraction of the resources that Rich has
allotted. The difference may lie in the fact that Poor has provided a
super-computer for its employees which enables them to produce more
innovations than Rich, which is only using desk-top computers. The IP
Guidelines recognize this factor and recommend that "specialized assets"
necessary to innovation also be accounted for.'34 Nevertheless, an asset
capable of making as large an impact on innovation as computer
equipment can hardly be considered specialized to one particular
industry.'3 5
Alternative methods of evaluating innovative output and capability,
which the IP Guidelines may adopt, have been offered by economists. 36 One method of measuring innovative output is by assessing
the number of inventions that have been patented.' 37 However, this
method also has significant drawbacks which, more often than not, will
lead to inaccurate correlations between R&D input and innovative output.
Many innovations are never patented because whether an innovation is
patented depends not only on the importance and economic significance
of the innovation, but also on a company's policies and goals. 3 For
example, it is possible that Rich actually conceived four innovations
eligible for patent protection but did not patent three of them, opting
instead to rely on trade secret protection. Thus, Rich is inaccurately
characterized as having a smaller innovation market share than it really
does because it holds only one patent. Furthermore, the existence of a
patent does not signify how much innovative effort took place to obtain
the patent. While a ground breaking patent may have taken enormous
amounts of innovative input to obtain, subsequent patents that result from

133. Id.
134. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
135. See Rapp, supra note 120, at 37 (discussing the difficulty in determining what constitutes
a "specialized asset").
136. Acs & Audretsch, supra note 20, at 3.

137. Id.
138. J.E.S. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 41 (2d ed. 1978). Patents play a role in
company policy in that the sole reason a patent may be acquired is for its negotiating power or to
deter rivals from entering the field. Id; see also FTCHearings on IP Policy,supra note 47, at 670

(comments of F.M. Scherer) (noting that studies have revealed that companies consider patents "the
least important means of securing the competitive advantages from new products").
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the improvements on the original design require much less innovative
input. 3 9 Poor could be characterized as having a larger share of the
innovation market even though all four of Poor's patents may only be
improvements on Rich's patent and the four required minimal innovative
effort by Poor. Unfortunately, merely measuring the quantity of patents
is not sufficient. It has been suggested that before patents can be an
effective indicator of R&D input, primary patents which signify
innovation must be distinguished from secondary patents, which are the
result of the development of existing technology. 4 '
Another method of measuring innovation output is by directly
measuring the innovative activity.'4 ' This may be the most reasonable
alternative to measuring the R&D resources and the number of patents.
This is accomplished by identifying new*innovations that are technologically and economically significant.'42 This method would assess Rich's
innovative output not only by identifying patented innovations, but also
would seek to differentiate between primary and secondary patents and
would take into account Rich's innovations which were not patented for
strategic reasons. However, if those strategic reasons include the use of
innovations as trade secrets, then it may be difficult to acquire an
accurate innovation market share because Rich may be reluctant to
disclose its technology without some sort of protection from misappropriation of the trade secrets. While this last method may obtain a
relatively accurate analysis for measuring current innovative activity, it
would fail in determining Rich's capability to innovate in the future or
become a potential market participant if it was not already in the
innovation market.
It should be noted that it is not being argued that R&D has
absolutely no relationship to innovative output. Obviously, if R&D is
entirely eliminated, it is more than likely that innovative output will be
decreased. However, what relationship the two criteria have is unclear
and not specific enough to define an innovation market. While economists have made significant progress in measuring innovative output and
capability, it is almost certain that measuring R&D capability and other

139. PARKER, supra note 138, at 41; see also FTC Hearings on IP Policy, supra note 47, at
671-72 (comments of John Barton) (discussing the incremental nature of technological innovation
and how "follow-on" researchers and developers may require antitrust protection from the primary
patent holder).
140. PARKER, supra note 138, at 41.
141. Acs & Audretsch, supra note 20, at 3.

142. Id. at 5.
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measures of innovation will not return consistent measures of innovative
output and capacity.'43
B.

Who Are the Innovators?

The IPGuidelines determine innovation market share by measuring
the shares of R&D expenditures of each participant in the relevant
market.'" Necessarily implicit in this analysis is the accurate determination of the participants in the market. For example, in the Rich and
Poor example, attributing innovation market shares only to the two firms
is meaningless unless it can be ascertained that they are the only two
participants in the innovation market. However, unlike goods markets, it
is difficult to assess who the participants are in innovation markets. 45
Innovation participants are difficult to determine because almost anyone
with the appropriate resources is capable
of innovating and the capacity
46
monopolize.1
to
difficult
is
innovate
to
1. R&D and Non-Manufacturers as Innovators
Innovators have been separated into three basic categories. Users are
those who derive benefit from actually using the innovation. 147 For
example, everyone who drives is a user of the automobile and all of the
innovations in it. Manufacturers are those who derive benefit or profit
from manufacturing the innovation. 4 General Motors is a manufacturer that benefits from manufacturing automobiles and all of the innovations incorporated into the automobile. Lastly, suppliers are those who
143. Id. at 3 ("[P]erhaps the greatest obstacle to understanding the role of innovation in
economic processes has been the lack of meaningful measures of innovative inputs and outputs.");
see also COOMBS ET AL., supra note 105, at 56 ("[T]he uncertainties of any long term investment,
and particularly one which involves the intrinsic unpredictability of some technical events, means
that the calculation of a return on the [R&D] investment is almost impossible ... and still open to
question.. . .'); Rapp, supra note 120, at 33-36; FTC Hearingson Innovationand Efficiency, supra
note 61, at 515 (comments of Roger Noll). But see Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 121, at 76-78
(defending their position that a sufficient relationship exists between innovation and R&D upon
which an innovation market may be defined); FTC Hearings Explore Approaches to Consider
Innovation and R&D, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1735, at 493 (Oct. 26, 1995)
[hereinafter FTC Hearings on Innovation and R&D] (comments of Richard J. Gilbert).
144, IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3,2.3.
145. Goods participants are generally identifiable by the standards set out in the Merger
Guidelines. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 1.
146, See Rapp, supra note 120, at 36-37 (stating that since the main inputs to innovation---scientists, engineers, laboratories, computer equipment, etc.---are always on the market, "there
is no opportunity to comer the market for innovation").
147. ERic VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 3 (1988).
148. Id.
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derive "benefit [or profit] from supplying components... necessary to
build or use the innovation." 149 Du Pont is an example of an
automotive supplier. To which innovative category a company belongs
depends on the technology in question."' For example, Du Pont is a
user of the scientific instruments it utilizes in its business, but also is the
supplier of the products it sells to General Motors for use in automobiles.
More significantly, the technology in question also determines which
of the three categories of innovators are responsible for the innovations
in that technology. In a study of various different technologies and the
source of innovations in those technologies, it was revealed that there
were "striking variations in the functional source[s] of innovation. 15 t
For example, innovation in the ceramic engine materials field may be
exclusively the province of suppliers of engine components, while the
innovation in the biotechnology field may be primarily the result of the
effects of manufacturers. This does not imply, however, that R&D is
distributed proportionately among manufacturers, suppliers, and other
sources of innovation in each one of the aforementioned technologies.
Research and development has traditionally been the province of
manufacturers. 5 2 Product manufacturers began organizing R&D
departments to avoid becoming victims of technological advances, and
1 53
instead, to internalize control and benefit from such innovations.
This gave manufacturers a greater degree of control over their
future-i.e., where their products and technology would be at some time
in the future. However, this push to control one's own technological
destiny did not spread to users and suppliers, and today, there still exists
the assumption that R&D is for the companies that will manufacture the
products for sale to users."M Manufacturers are expected to "find a
need and fill it by executing the new product development ....91155
This long history of R&D would lead one to believe that manufacturers are the primary source of innovation. Ironically, however, the

149. Id.
150. See id.at 4.
151. Id. One of von Hippel's studies revealed that in scientific instrument technology, users
accounted for 77% of the innovation, with manufacturers responsible for the remaining percentage

of innovations. Id. In contrast, 94% of tractor technology was innovated by manufacturers, with the
remaining 6% by the users. Id. Suppliers also play an active role in certain technologies; suppliers
were responsible for 56% of the innovation in wire ternination technology and 36% of the
innovation in thermoplastic technology. Id.
152. Id. at 3.
153. COOMBS ET AL., supra note 105, at 10.
154. VON HIPPEL, supra note 147, at 9.
155. Id. at 25.
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source of innovation in certain technologies has largely been found to be
the user or, more generally, the non-manufacturer." 6 The only role
manufacturers play in these technologies is one of diffusion. They serve
to diffuse the technology or take the innovations from the non-manufacturers and commercialize them. 57 However, in these technologies the
manufacturer's R&D facilities make no contribution to the innovative
process. The non-manufacturer is the primary source of the innovations,
despite its lack of R&D.'
The IP Guidelines propose to measure R&D capability, or those
"identifiable assets or characteristics upon which innovation depends," of
the firms that have the ability to innovate in technology. 5 9 Unfortunately, in technologies where non-manufacturers are the innovators, this
reliance on R&D as an indicator of innovative source is misguided. For
example, if the DOJ is investigating the scientific instrument market, it
will look to the manufacturers of instruments, since they are the entities
engaged in R&D in that technology. However, since seventy-seven
percent of the innovation in the scientific instrument market is produced
by users,"6 who traditionally have little or no R&D budgets, the IP
Guidelines will likely produce an inaccurate assessment of the innovation
market and the shares that each participant has within it. This problem
is compounded by the fact that the list of technologies in which nonmanufacturers are the innovators is extensive. 6' For example, users are
a high percentage of the innovators in semiconductor, printed circuit
board assembly process, and poltrusion (a method of manufacturing
plastic) technologies 62 Suppliers, also classified as non-manufacturers,
equipment
are innovators in wire termination equipment and process
63
utilizing industrial gases and thermoplastics technologies.'
2. R&D and Small Firm Innovators
The innovators, as described above, may be from either small or
large firms. Statistically, it has been found that small firms produce more

156. Id.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 3.2.3; see also supranotes 133-35 and accompanying text.
160. VON HIPPEL, supra note 147, at 4.
161. See generally id. at 28-42 (discussing technologies in which users and suppliers are
innovators).
162. Id. at 11-28.
163. Id. at 36-38.
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innovations than large firms." 4 In their 1991 study of firm size and
innovation, Chakrabarti and Halperin first summarized the results of
earlier studies on the same subject.
[S]mall firms contributed 10 per cent of all industrial innovations in the
United Kingdom while accounting for only 5 per cent of R&D
expenditure. Very large firms, on the other hand, accounted for 54 per
cent of R&D expenditure and accounted for 20 per cent of all
innovations. [Others] have concluded that "companies with less than
1000 employees commercialized a much greater share than is indicated
by their share of R&D expenditure." [Another study] found that small
firms produced 745 innovations per million employees while
large
65
firms generated only 313 innovations per million employees.'
Chakrabarti and Halperin's study found that smaller firms with small
R&D budgets produce more patents than larger firms with large R&D
budgets.'6 While they declined to suggest that smaller firms are more
efficient with their R&D budgets, they did acknowledge that productivity
is high for smaller firms. 67 Indeed, there is strong evidence that
innovative activity decreases as firm size and R&D expenditure
increase. 168 Furthermore, the Chakrabarti and Halperin study only
involved small firms that spend at least $10,000 annually on R&D and
did not include firms that have no R&D budgets at all. 6 9 In actuality,
studies have found that many small firms have no budget for R&D. 7
For example, assume in the Rich and Poor example that a company,
Upstart, exists which also develops ceramic engine materials. Upstart is
a small company working out of its owner's garage which has no R&D
budget or personnel and owns no patents relating to ceramic engine
material technology. Upstart has, however, developed three of the latest

164. Alok K. Chakrabarti & Michael R. Halperin, Technical Performance and Firm Size:
Analysis of Patentsand Publicationsof U.S. Firms, in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
71 (Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds., 1991).

165. Id. (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 81.
167. Id. at 80.
168. Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, R&D, Firm Size and Innovative Activity, in
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 39, 57 (Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds.,
1991).
169. Chakrabarti & Halperin, supra note 164, at 72.
170.

RoY ROTHWELL & WALTER ZEGVELD, INNOVATION AND THE SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED

FIRM 55 (1982) (stating that "probably less than 5 per cent of fins employing under 200 perform
formal R & D"); see, e.g., FTC Hearings on Innovation and Efficiency, supra note 61, at 513
(comments of Diran Apelian) (discussing the metal processing field's numerous small and mid-sized
firms that have low R&D budgets).
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significant innovations in the technology, which it has licensed to Rich
to commercialize. The IP Guidelines would likely fail to include Upstart
in the relevant innovation market because Upstart has no identifiable
assets related to innovation.
However, this inequity between innovative output and firm size is
not present in all areas of technology. In some technologies, smaller
firms are involved in innovation at the very early stages, while larger
firms take over at later stages of the innovation process, such as during
development and manufacture. 7 ' Furthermore, smaller firms are
generally limited to those technologies in which R&D is inexpensive,
although they react quickly when technology changes and market
conditions provide an opportunity to innovate. 72
Small firms play a very important role in certain technologies, and
since many have no "characteristics upon which innovation depends,"'7 1 it may be difficult for the DOJ to accurately locate them.
Even if the DOJ does manage to locate the firms, measuring R&D
capability may return inconsistent and inaccurate measurements of
innovative output and capability. Additionally, since the technology in
question is crucial to obtaining an accurate innovation market, defining
what the relevant technology is will suffer from the same substitution
problems which face the IP Guidelines' definition of technology
markets.'4
Consequently, although the IP Guidelines recognize the difficulties
in pinpointing participants or potential participants of an innovation
market and predicting the innovative capability of those participants, the
IP Guidelines fail to provide a viable alternative. The criteria in the IP
Guidelines will likely lead to speculation instead of an accurate
innovation market. The IP Guidelines actually make it more cumbersome to predict DOJ activity by forcing parties to a proposed licensing
agreement to apply the IP Guidelines to all three types of markets,
regardless of which market or combination of markets the DOJ actually
decides to challenge.
One possible solution to the difficultly in measuring innovative
capability is to not measure it at all. One court has gone as far as to say

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
T. Rapp

Chakrabarti & Halperin, supra note 164, at 81.
ROTHWELL & ZEGVELD, supra note 170, at 65.
IP GUIDELINe, supra note 4, § 3.2.3.
See generally supra part IV.
FTC Hearingson Innovation and R&D, supranote 143, at 492-93 (comments of Richard
& Dennis W. Carlton).
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that there is no need to monitor R&D if goods or products markets are
available for analysis. 76 "If design and development of such systems
is considered merely as part of a process leading to sale of [end
products], its independent analytical value is de minimus, and only the
177
sale of such systems or the prospects thereof need be examined.',
Unfortunately, while the goods market may be easier to define, it does
not advance the overall goal of the IP Guidelines: to make the licensing
of intellectual property more predictable.
C. Innovation Markets and Merger Analysis
When the IPGuidelines were originally released in draft form, they
included a section on the application of innovation markets to the
scrutiny of proposed acquisitions of intellectual property and
mergers. 7 In the final adopted version, however, the IP Guidelines
defer to the Merger Guidelines for any analysis of mergers and
acquisitions.'
It appears that the DOJ determined that confusion
would prevail if two sets of guidelines existed which discussed mergers
and acquisitions. Regardless, it is apparent that the DOJ still utilizes the
innovation market approach of challenging proposed acquisitions of
intellectual property and mergers. The DOJ has already challenged a
number of proposed mergers on innovation market grounds.se
However, it is questionable whether an innovation market is
necessary or even helpful to define in addition to goods markets when
scrutinizing proposed acquisitions of intellectual property and mergers of
companies involving substantial shares of an innovation market.' The
proposed acquisition of General Motors Corporation's ("GM") Allison

176. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1275 (N.D. Ohio

1977).
177. Id.
178. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING AND ACQUISITION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.7 (Aug. 8, 1994).

179. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 5.7.
180. For a detailed list of recent enforcement theories involving innovation markets, see
Hoemer, supra note 121, at 70-73; see also Rapp, supra note 120, at 40-46 (discussing several
complaints and consent decrees in which innovation markets were involved).
181. For a more detailed analysis of innovation markets as applied to merger enforcement, see
Symposium, A Critical Appraisal of the "Innovation Market" Approach, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 1
(1995); Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, IncorporatingDynamic Efficiency Concerns in
Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995); Steven C.
Sunshine & Thad A. Davis, When Analyzing a PotentialMerger,the Department of Justice and the
FederalTrade Commission Now Also Examine Its Anti-Competitive Effect on Innovation,NAT'L LJ.,
Dec. 11, 1995, at B5.
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Transmission Division ("Allison") by ZF Friedrichshafen, AG ("ZF") in
1993,182 illustrates how a goods market and existing antitrust analysis
are sufficient to challenge a proposed merger.
Allison and ZF, both manufacturers of medium and heavy duty
automatic transmissions for buses and trucks, were considered by the
DOJ to be each other's main competitor. t8 3 The DOJ promptly challenged the proposal on the grounds that the acquisition would result in
the concentration of market power with Allison such that it would
diminish R&D in the technological innovation of heavy duty automatic
transmissions."u The only other manufacturer of such transmissions,
J.M. Voith, was not considered an aggressive competitor or innovator by
the DOJ because it only manufactured bus transmissions. 185 The GM
Complaint alleged that the acquisition would result in a loss of competition in "a line of commerce defined as technological innovation in the
design, development, and production of medium and heavy automatic
transmissions for commercial and military vehicles (the 'Innovation
Market').' 8 6 The DOJ also spent considerable time in the GM Complaint alleging that no substitutes existed which consumers would accept
87
for the automatic transmissions that Allison and ZF were producing.'
The crux of the allegations in the GM Complaint was that no other
firms were capable of entering the innovation market in the reasonable
future "in a manner sufficient to restore significant competition that
'
would be lost if the proposed transaction were to be consummated."188
The only participants in the innovation market, according to the DOJ,
were Allison and ZF. This illustrates the DOJ's failure to recognize that
innovation has sources much more diverse than just the manufacturers of
a particular technology. While the start-up costs and knowledge required

182. Complaint 8, United States v. General Motors Corp., (D. Del. filed Nov. 16, 1993) (No.
93-530) [hereinafter GM Complaint]. Although this complaint was filed over a year before the IP
Guidelines were released by the DOJ, the comments of Assistant Attorney General, Anne K.
Bingaman, indicate that the GM Complaint follows DOJ policy on intellectual property and antitrust.
"One of the more important enforcement actions of the [Antitrust] Division was our suit against the

proposed acquisition of GM's Allison Division by ZF Friedrichshafen ....

Our focus on innovation

in GM is an example of how we will continue to strive to protect competition in technology."
Colloquy, supra note 5, at 328. GM and ZF abandoned the deal after DOJ pressure increased.
Dealwatch, The Sidetracking ofa GMDivestiture,MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 17.
183. GM Complaint, supra note 182, 1.
184. Id. 2.
185. Id. 25.
186. Id. 39.
187. Id. 4 12-16, 21, 29, 40.
188. Id. 45; see also id. 27.
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to participate directly in the medium and heavy duty transmission
innovation market is undoubtedly high, it still may not be not restrictive
of small firm or user innovators. The GM Complaint failed to disclose
whether the source of innovation in the designated innovation market was
the manufacturers, suppliers, or users, and how much, if any, of Allison
and ZF's R&D work was comprised of developing technology diffused
from other sources.
Regardless of the accuracy of the DOJ's innovation market
definition, it was likely unnecessary to resort to a complicated and
possibly inaccurate innovation market to challenge this acquisition in the
first place. A standard goods market analysis would have reached the
same result as the innovation market approach. If the DOJ had applied
the Merger Guidelines approach of defining the relevant market,
measuring the relevant market shares, and then measuring the market
concentration, 18 it is likely that the DOJ would have challenged the
acquisition regardless of its effect on the innovation market.
The GM Complaint provided sufficient market data to conclude that
the relevant market was that of heavy duty automatic transmissions for
buses and trucks in the United States. 19° While individual market shares
for GM and ZF were not given for the goods market, the GM Complaint
did disclose that, when combined, they had approximately seventy-eight
percent of the market.'91 From the market share, the market concentration may have been calculated by using the Herflndahl-Hirschman Index
(" HI"). The HHI index is calculated by adding the squares of each
competitor's market share in the relevant market, 92 and assists in
determining whether a merger will be challenged. 93 The GM Complaint disclosed that this acquisition would have resulted in an increase
of market concentration by close to 1000 HHI points in a market that
was already highly concentrated (HI of approximately 6500).' 94 The

189. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 1.
190. GM Complaint, supra note 182, % 11-18.
191. Id. 26.
192. MERGER GUIDELNES, supra note 73, § 1.5. A pure monopoly (100% market share) yields
a maximum HHIl index of 10,000. An HHI index below 1000 indicates an unconcentrated market,
between 1000 and 1800 is considered moderately concentrated, and a value above 1800 is considered
highly concentrated.
193. Mergers in unconcentrated markets and mergers in moderately concentrated markets that
will result in less than a 100 point increase in the HHI index usually are not challenged. Id. § 1.51
(a)-(b). Mergers in moderately concentrated markets that will result in greater than a 100 point
increase are carefully reviewed for anticompetitive effects. Id. § 1.15 (b). Mergers in highly
concentrated markets that yield less than a 50 point increase also are not challenged.
194. GM Complaint, supra note 182, 26.
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Merger Guidelines would almost always consider a merger with these
characteristics suspect.' 9'
Applying standard horizontal merger case law to this set of facts
also will likely lead to the merger being successfully challenged. 196 In
United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,'9 7 the Supreme Court held
that
a merger which produces a finn controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects.'98
In PhiladelphiaNational Bank, it was also found that as little as thirty
percent of the relevant market was excessive.' 99 Indeed, the DOJ
realized the strength of the goods market cause of action and plead it in
the alternative to the innovation market cause.2"
Therefore, the wisdom of measuring innovation markets in merger
analysis is questionable since similar results may be obtained by
analyzing related goods markets.2"' By defining innovation markets, the
IP Guidelines only serve to decrease the predictability of antitrust
enforcement in mergers and acquisitions. The innovation market creates
a market which few people, including those considering a merger or
acquisition, will have the information to assess and define accurately.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the DOJ has made a commendable attempt to clarify the
analysis it will use when investigating intellectual property agreements,

195. Mergers producing an increase of greater than 50 points in highly concentrated markets
are considered suspect and will be challenged. Mergers producing greater than a 100 point increase
in a market with an HHI index over 1800 will lead to a presumption that market power has been
created or enhanced which can only be overcome by a showing to the contrary. MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 73, § 1.51 (c).
196. Rapp, supra note 120, at 40-41.
197. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
198. Id. at 363.
199. Id. at 364.
200. See GM Complaint, supra note 182, 47.
201, Rapp, supra note 120, at 24-46. But see Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 121, at 80-82; cf
Sunshine & Davis, supra note 181, at B5 (describing the innovation market approach as another
"tool-which is appropriately used only in limited circumstances-that can aid in predicting a
merger's effect on competition").
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its proposed analysis fails to sufficiently take into account the unique
aspects of technology and innovation market definitions. Unfortunately,
in doing so, the DOJ may have served only to confuse matters further.
The problems in defining a technology and innovation market share are
such that the IP Guidelines are not specific enough to provide the
predictability that the IP Guidelines strive to achieve. In fact, since
technology and innovation are essentially information that is usually
highly guarded, 2 it will be difficult for even those involved in the
technologies to adequately define the participants and their respective
market shares. Consequently, as even the IP Guidelines acknowledge, it
may be more predictable to remain with a thorough and accurate
assessment of the downstream goods market that is ultimately affected
by the intellectual property licenses in question. Moreover, it is likely
that a competent analysis of the goods market will yield the same results
as any prospective technology or innovation market determination.
Azam H. Aziz

202. Barry A. Pupkin, Widening Antitrust Coverage in the Era of Technology, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 7, 10 ("Unlike markets for existing products, in which production,
sales, and price information is readily ascertainable, research and development is, for the most part,
a private and proprietary activity. The goals and the status of a company's research and development
are not generally made public.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss2/10

40

